Theories of European Integration free essay sample

For many old ages, the academic survey of the European Communities ( EC ) , as they were so called, was virtually synonymous with the survey of European integrating. The ab initio modest and mostly technocratic accomplishments of the EC seemed less important than the possible that they represented for the gradual integrating of the states of western Europe into something else: a supranational civil order. When the integrating procedure was traveling good, as during the 1950s and early 1960s, neo-functionalists and other theoreticians sought to explicate the procedure whereby European integrating proceeded from modest sectoral beginnings to something broader and more ambitious. When things seemed to be traveling severely, as from the 1960s until the early 1980s, intergovernmentalists and others sought to explicate why the integrating procedure had non proceeded every bit swimmingly as its laminitiss had hoped. Regardless of the differences among these organic structures of theory, we can state clearly that the early literature on the EC sought to explicate the procedure of European integrating (instead than, state, policy-making ) , and that in making so it drew mostly ( but non entirely ) on theories of international dealingss. We will write a custom essay sample on Theories of European Integration or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page In the first edition of this volume, Carole Webb ( 1977 ) surveyed the argument among the so dominant schools of European integrating, neo-functionalism, and intergovernmentalism, pulling from each attack a set of deductions and hypotheses about the nature of the EC policy procedure. Similarly, here we review neo-functionalism and its positions about the EU policy procedure, and so the intergovernmentalist response, every bit good as the updating of # 8216 ; broad intergovernmentalism # 8217 ; by Andrew Moravcsik in the 1990s. In add-on, we examine more recent organic structures of integrating theory-institutionalism and constructivism-which offer really different positions of the integrating procedure and really different deductions for EU policy-making. Neo-functionalism Neo-functionalism In 1958, on the Eve of the constitution of the EEC and Euratom, Ernst Haas published his seminal work, The Uniting of Europe, puting out a # 8216 ; neo-functionalist # 8217 ; theory of regional integrating. As elaborated in subsequent texts by Haas and other bookmans ( e. g. Haas 1961 ; Lindberg 1963 ; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970 ) , neo-functionalism posited a procedure of # 8216 ; functional spill-over # 8217 ; , in which the initial determination by authoritiess to put a certain sector, such as coal and steel, under the authorization of cardinal establishments creates force per unit areas to widen the authorization of the establishments into neighboring countries of policy, such as currency exchange rates, revenue enhancement, and rewards. Therefore, neo-functionalists predicted, sectoral integrating would bring forth the unintended and unanticipated effect of advancing farther integrating in extra issue countries. George ( 1991 ) identifies a 2nd strand of the spill-over pro cedure, which he calls # 8216 ; political # 8217 ; spill-over, in which both supranational histrions ( such as the Commission ) and subnational histrions ( involvement groups or others within the member provinces ) create extra force per unit areas for farther integrating. At the subnational degree, Haas suggested that involvement groups runing in an incorporate sector would hold to interact with the international organisation charged with the direction of their sector. Over clip, these groups would come to appreciate the benefits from integrating, and would thereby reassign their demands, outlooks, and even their truenesss from national authoritiess to a new Centre, therefore going an of import force for farther integrating. At the supranational degree, furthermore, organic structures such as the Commission would promote such a transportation of truenesss, advancing European policies and brokering deals among the member provinces so as to # 8216 ; upgrade the common involvement # 8217 ; . As a consequence of such sectoral and political spill-over, neo-functionalists predicted, sectoral integrating would go self-sufficient, taking to the creative activity of a new political entity with its Centre in Brussels. The most of import part of neo-functionalists to the survey of EU policy-making was their conceptualisation of a # 8216 ; Community method # 8217 ; of policy-making. As Webb pointed out, this ideal-type Community method was based mostly on the observation of a few specific sectors ( the common agricultural policy ( CAP ) , and the imposts brotherhood, see Chapters 4 and 15 ) during the formative old ages of the Community, and presented a distinguishable image of EC policy-making as a procedure driven by an entrepreneurial Commission and having supranational deliberation among member-state representatives in the Council. The Community method in this position was non merely a legal set of policy-making establishments but a # 8216 ; procedural codification # 8217 ; conditioning the outlooks and the behavior of the participants in the procedure. The cardinal elements of this original Community method, Webb ( 1977: 13-14 ) continued, were quadruple: 1.governments accept the Commission as a valid bargaining spouse and anticipate it to play an active function in constructing a policy consensus. 2.governments trade with each other with a committedness to problem-solving, and negotiate over how to accomplish corporate determinations, and non whether these are desirable or non. 3.governments, the Commission, and other participants in the procedure are antiphonal to each other, do non do unacceptable demands, and are willing to do short term forfeits in outlook of longer term additions. 4. Unanimity is the regulation, asking that dialogues continue until all expostulations are overcome or losingss in one country are compensated for by additions in another. Issues are non seen as separate but related in a uninterrupted procedure of determination such that # 8216 ; log-rolling # 8217 ; and # 8216 ; side payments # 8217 ; are possible. This Community method, Webb suggested, characterized EEC decision-making during the period from 1958 to 1963, as the original six member provinces met alongside the Commission to set in topographic point the indispensable elements of the EEC imposts brotherhood and the CAP. By 1965, nevertheless, Charles de Gaulle, the Gallic President, had precipitated the alleged # 8216 ; Luxembourg crisis # 8217 ; , take a firm standing on the importance of province sovereignty and arguably go againsting the inexplicit procedural codification of the Community method. The EEC, which had been scheduled to travel to extensive qualified bulk vote ( QMV ) in 1966, continued to take most determinations de factoby unanimity, the Commission emerged weakened from its confrontation with de Gaulle, and the nation-state appeared to hold reasserted itself. These inclinations were reinforced, furthermore, by developments in the seventiess, when economic recession led to the rise of new non-tariff barriers to merchandise among EC member provinces and when the intergovernmental facets of the Community were strengthened by the creative activity in 1974 of the European Council, a regular acme meeting of EU caputs of province and authorities. In add-on, the Committee of Permanent Representatives ( Coreper ) , an intergovernmental organic structure of member-state representatives, emerged as a important decision-making organic structure fixing statute law for acceptance by the Council of Ministers. Similarly, empirical surveies showed the importance of national gatekeeping establishments ( H. Wallace 1973 ) . Even some of the major progresss of this period, such as the creative activity of the European pecuniary system ( EMS ) in 1978 were taken outside the construction of the EEC Treaty, and with no formal function for the Commission or other supranational EC establishments. Intergovernmentalism Intergovernmentalism Reflecting these developments, a new # 8216 ; intergovernmentalist # 8217 ; school of integrating theory emerged, get downing with Stanley Hoffmann # 8217 ; s ( 1966 ) claim that the nation-state, far from being disused, had proven # 8216 ; obstinate # 8217 ; . Most evidently with de Gaulle, but subsequently with the accession of new member provinces such as the UK, Ireland, and Denmark in 1973, member authoritiess made clear that they would defy the gradual transportation of sovereignty to the Community, and that EC decision-making would reflect the go oning primacy of the nation-state. Under these fortunes, Haas himself ( 1976 ) pronounced the # 8216 ; obsolescence of regional integrating theory # 8217 ; , while other bookmans such as Paul Taylor ( 1983 ) , and William Wallace ( 1982 ) argued that neo-functionalists had underestimated the resiliency of the nation-state. At the same clip, historical scholarship by Alan Milward and others ( Milward 2000 ; Milward and Lynch 199 3 ) supported the position that EU member authoritiess, instead than supranational organisations, played the cardinal function in the historical development of the EU and were strengthened, instead than weakened, as a consequence of the integrating procedure. By contrast with neo-functionalists, the intergovernmentalist image suggested that # 8216 ; the bargaining and consensus edifice techniques which have emerged in the Communities are mere polishs of intergovernmental diplomatic negotiations # 8217 ; ( Webb 1977: 18 ) . And so, the early editions of Policy-Making in the European Communitiesfound important grounds of intergovernmental bargaining as the dominant manner of policy-making in many ( but non all ) issue countries. Broad intergovernmentalism Liberal intergovernmentalism The period from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s has been characterized as # 8216 ; the stagnation epoch # 8217 ; , both for the integrating procedure and for scholarship on the EU ( Keeler 2004 ; Jupille 2005 ) . While a dedicated nucleus of EU bookmans continued to progress the empirical survey of the EU during this period, much of this work either eschewed expansive theoretical claims about the integrating procedure or accepted with minor alterations the theoretical linguistic communication of the neo-functionalist/intergovernmentalist argument. With the # 8216 ; relaunching # 8217 ; of the integrating procedure in the mid-1980s, nevertheless, scholarship on the EU exploded, and the theoretical argument was revived. While some of this scholarship viewed the relaunching of the integrating procedure as a exoneration of earlier neo-functionalist theoretical accounts ( Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991 ; Zysman and Sandholtz 1989 ) , Andrew Moravcsik ( 1993a, 1998 ) argued influentially that even these stairss frontward could be accounted for by a revised intergovernmental theoretical account stressing the power and penchants of EU member provinces. In other words, Moravcsik # 8217 ; s # 8216 ; broad intergovernmentalism # 8217 ; is a three-step theoretical account, which combines: ( 1 ) a broad theory of national penchant formation with ; ( 2 ) an intergovernmental theoretical account of EU-level bargaining ; and ( 3 ) a theoretical account of institutional pick stressing the function of international establishments in supplying # 8216 ; believable committednesss # 8217 ; for member authoritiess. In the first or broad phase of the theoretical account, national heads of authorities ( COGs ) aggregate the involvements of their domestic constituencies, every bit good as their ain involvements, and joint their several national penchants toward the EU. Thus, national penchants are complex, reflecting the typical economic sciences, parties, and establishments of ea ch member province, but they are determined domestically, non shaped by engagement in the EU, as some neo-functionalists had proposed. In the 2nd or intergovernmental phase, national authoritiess bring their penchants to the bargaining tabular array in Brussels, where understandings reflect the comparative power of each member province, and where supranational organisations such as the Commission exert small or no influence over policy results. By contrast with neo-functionalists, who emphasized the entrepreneurial and brokering functions of the Commission and the upgrading of the common involvement among member provinces in the Council, Moravcsik and other intergovernmentalists emphasized the hardball bargaining among member provinces and the importance of dickering power, bundle trades, and # 8216 ; side payments # 8217 ; as determiners of intergovernmental deals on the most of import EU determinations. Third and eventually, Moravcsik puts frontward a rational pick theory of institutional pick, reasoning that EU member provinces adopt peculiar EU institutions-pooling sovereignty through QMV, or deputing sovereignty to supranational histrions like the Commission and the Court-in order to increase the credibleness of their common committednesss. In this position, crowned head provinces seeking to collaborate among themselves constantly face a strong enticement to rip off or # 8216 ; desert # 8217 ; from their understandings. Pooling and deputing sovereignty through international organisations, he argues, allows provinces to perpetrate themselves believably to their common promises, by supervising province conformity with international understandings and make fulling in the spaces of wide international pacts, such as those that have constituted the EC/EU. In empirical footings, Moravcsik argues that the EU # 8217 ; s historic intergovernmental understandings, such as the 1957 Treaties of Rome and the 1992 Treaty on European Union ( TEU ) , were non driven chiefly by supranational enterprisers, unintended spillovers from earlier integrating, or multinational alliances of involvement groups, but instead by a gradual procedure of penchant convergence among the most powerful member provinces, which so struck cardinal deals among themselves, offered side-payments to smaller member provinces, and delegated purely limited powers to supranational organisations that remained more or less obedient retainers of the member provinces. Overarching the three stairss of this theoretical account is a # 8216 ; positivist model # 8217 ; of international cooperation. The relevant histrions are assumed to hold fixed penchants ( for wealth, power, etc ) , and move consistently to accomplish those penchants within the restraints posed by the establishments within which they act. As Moravcsik ( 1998: 19-20 ) points out: The term model (as opposed to theoryor theoretical account) is employed here to denominate a set of premises that permit us to disaggregate a phenomenon we seek to explain-in this instance, consecutive unit of ammunitions of international negotiations-into elements each of which can be treated individually. More focussed theories-each of class consistent with the premises of the overall positivist framework-are employed to explicate each component. The elements are so aggregated to make a multicausal account of a big complex result such as a major many-sided understanding. During the 1990s, broad intergovernmentalism emerged as arguably the taking theory of European integrating, yet its basic theoretical premises were questioned by international dealingss bookmans coming from two different waies. A first group of bookmans, collected under the rubrics of rational pick and historical institutionalism, accepted Moravcsik # 8217 ; s positivist premises, but rejected his spare, institutionfree theoretical account of intergovernmental bargaining as an accurate description of the EU policy procedure. By contrast, a 2nd school of idea, pulling from sociological institutionalism and constructivism, raised more cardinal expostulations to the methodological individuality of rational pick theory in favor of an attack in which national penchants and individualities were shaped, at least in portion, by EU norms and regulations. The # 8216 ; new institutionalisms # 8217 ; in rational pick The ‘new institutionalisms’ in rational pick The rise of institutionalist analysis of the EU did non develop in isolation, but reflected a gradual and widespread re-introduction of establishments into a big organic structure of theories ( such as pluralism, Marxism, and neo-realism ) , in which establishments had been either absent or considered epiphenomenal, contemplations of deeper causal factors or procedures such as capitalist economy or the distribution of power in domestic societies or in the international system. By contrast with these institution-free histories of political relations, which dominated much of political scientific discipline between the 1950s and the 1970s, three primary # 8216 ; institutionalisms # 8217 ; developed during the class of the 1980s and early 1990s, each with a distinguishable definition of establishments and a distinguishable history of how they # 8216 ; affair # 8217 ; in the survey of political relations ( March and Olsen 1984, 1989 ; Hall and Taylor 1996 ) . The first arose within the rational-choice attack to the survey of political relations, as pioneered by pupils of American political relations. Rational pick institutionalism began with the attempt by American political scientists to understand the beginnings and effects of US Congressional establishments on legislative behavior and policy results. More specifically, rational pick bookmans noted that majoritarian theoretical accounts of Congressional decision-making predicted that policy results would be inherently unstable, since a simple bulk of policy-makers could ever organize a alliance to turn over bing statute law, yet substantial bookmans of the US Congress found considerable stableness in Congressional policies. In this context, Kenneth Shepsle ( 1979, 1986 ) argued that Congressional establishments, and in peculiar the commission system, could bring forth # 8216 ; structure-induced equilibrium # 8217 ; , by governing some options as allowable or impermissible, and by stru cturing the voting power and the veto power of assorted histrions in the decision-making procedure. More late, Shepsle and others have turned their attending to the job of # 8216 ; equilibrium establishments # 8217 ; , viz. , how histrions choose or design establishments to procure common additions, and how those establishments change or persist over clip. Shepsle # 8217 ; s invention and the subsequent development of the rational pick attack to establishments have produced a figure of theoretical outgrowths with possible applications to both comparative and international political relations. For illustration, Shepsle and others have examined in some item the # 8216 ; agenda-setting # 8217 ; power of Congressional commissions, which can direct bill of exchange statute law to the floor that is frequently easier to follow than it is to amend. In another outgrowth, pupils of the US Congress have developed # 8216 ; principal-agent # 8217 ; theoretical accounts of Congressional deputation to regulative bureaucratisms and to tribunals, and they have problematized the conditions under which legislative principals are able-or unable-to control their several agents ( Moe 1984 ; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991 ) . More late, Epstein and O # 8217 ; Halloran ( 1999 ) , and others ( Huber and Shipan 2002 ) have pioneered a # 8216 ; transaction-co st attack # 8217 ; to the design of political establishments, reasoning that legislators intentionally and consistently plan political establishments to minimise the dealing costs associated with the devising of public policy. Although originally formulated and applied in the context of American political establishments, rational-choice institutionalist penetrations # 8216 ; travel # 8217 ; to other domestic and international contexts, and were rapidly taken up by pupils of the EU. Reacting to the increasing importance of EU institutional regulations, such as the cooperation and co-decision processs, these writers argued that strictly intergovernmental theoretical accounts of EU decision-making underestimated the causal importance of formal EU regulations in determining policy results. In an early application of rational-choice theory to the EU, for illustration, Fritz Scharpf ( 1988 ) argued that the inefficiency and rigidness of the CAP and other EU policies was due non merely to the EU # 8217 ; s intergovernmentalism, but besides to specific institutional regulations, such as consentaneous decision-making and the # 8216 ; default status # 8217 ; in the event that the member provinces failed to hold on a common policy. By the mid-1990s, George Tsebelis, Geoffrey Garrett, and many others sought to pattern the selection-and in peculiar the functioning-of EU establishments, including the acceptance, executing, and adjudication of EU public policies, in footings of rational pick. Many of these surveies drew progressively on relevant literatures from comparative political relations, and are hence reviewed in the 2nd portion of this chapter. By contrast, sociological institutionalism and constructivist attacks in international dealingss defined establishments much more loosely to include informal norms and conventions every bit good as informal regulations. They argued that such establishments could # 8216 ; constitute # 8217 ; histrions, determining their individualities and hence their penchants in ways that rational-choice attacks could non capture ( see following subdivision ) . Historical institutionalists took up a place between these two cantonments, concentrating on the effects of establishments over clip, in peculiar on the ways in which a given set of establishments, one time established, can act upon or cons develop the behavior of the histrions who established them. In its initial preparations ( Hall 1986 ; Thelen and Steinmo 1992 ) , historical institutionalism was seen as holding double effects, act uponing both the restraints on single histrions andtheir penchants, thereby doing the theory a # 8216 ; large collapsible shelter # 8217 ; , embracing the nucleus penetrations of the positivist and constructivist cantonments. their penchants, thereby doing the theory a ‘big tent’ , embracing the nucleus penetrations of the positivist and constructivist cantonments. What makes historical institutionalism distinctive, nevertheless, is its accent on the effects of establishments on political relations over clip. In possibly the most sophisticated presentation of this thought, Paul Pierson ( 2000 ) has argued that political establishments are characterized by what economic experts call # 8216 ; increasing returns # 8217 ; , insofar as they create inducements for histrions to lodge with and non abandon bing establishments, accommodating them merely incrementally in response to altering fortunes. Therefore, political relations should be characterized by certain interconnected phenomena, including: inactiveness, or # 8216 ; lock-ins # 8217 ; , whereby bing establishments may stay in equilibrium for extended periods despite considerable political alteration ; a critical function for timing and sequencing, in which comparatively little and contingent events at critical occasions early in a sequence form events that occur subsequently ; and path-depe ndence, in which early determinations provide inducements for histrions to perpetuate institutional and policy picks inherited from the yesteryear, even when the ensuing results are obviously inefficient. Understood in this visible radiation, historical institutionalist analyses typically begin with rationalist premises about histrion penchants, and continue to analyze how establishments can determine the behavior of rational histrions over clip through institutional lock-ins and procedures of way dependance. In recent old ages, these penetrations have been applied progressively to the development of the EU, with assorted writers stressing the temporal dimension of European integrating ( Armstrong and Bulmer 1998 ) . Pierson # 8217 ; s ( 1996b ) survey of path-dependence in the EU, for illustration, seeks to understand Pierson’s ( 1996b ) survey of path-dependence in the EU, for illustration, seeks to understand European integrating as a procedure that unfolds over clip, and the conditions under which path-dependent procedures are most likely to happen. Working from basically rationalist premises, Pierson argues that, despite the initial primacy of member authoritiess in the design of EU establishments and policies, # 8216 ; gaps # 8217 ; may happen in the ability of member authoritiess to command the subsequent development of establishments and policies, for four grounds. First, member authoritiess in democratic societies may, because of electoral concerns, use a high # 8216 ; price reduction rate # 8217 ; to the hereafter, holding to EU policies that lead to a long-run loss of national control in return for short-run electoral returns. Second, even when authoritiess do non to a great extent dismiss the hereafter, unintended effects of institutional picks can make extra spreads, which member authoritiess may or may non be able to shut through subsequent action. Third, the penchants of m ember authoritiess are likely to alter over clip, most evidently because of electoral turnover, go forthing new authoritiess with new penchants to inherit an acquis communautairenegotiated by, and harmonizing to the penchants of, a old authorities. Give the frequent demand of consentaneous vote ( or the high hurdle of QMV ) to turn over past institutional and policy picks, single member authoritiess are likely to happen themselves # 8216 ; immobilized by the weight of past enterprises # 8217 ; ( Pierson 1996b: 137 ) . Finally, EU establishments and policies can go locked-in non merely as a consequence of change-resistant establishments from above, but besides through the incremental growing of entrenched support for bing establishments from below, as social histrions adapt to and develop a vested involvement in the continuance of specific EU policies. In the country of societal policy, for illustration, the European Court of Justice ( ECJ ) has developed law on issues such as gend er equity and workplace wellness and safety that surely exceeded the initial outlooks of the member provinces ; yet these determinations have proven hard to turn over back, both because of the demand for consentaneous understanding to turn over ECJ determinations and because domestic constituencies have developed a vested involvement in their continued application. At their best, historical institutionalist analyses offer non merely the commonplace observation that establishments are # 8216 ; gluey # 8217 ; , but besides a tool kit for foretelling and explicating underwhat conditionswe should anticipate institutional lock-ins and path-dependent behavior. More specifically, we should anticipate that, ceteris paribus, establishments and policies will be most immune to alter: where their change requires a consentaneous understanding among member provinces, or the consent of supranational histrions like the Commission or the Parliament ; and where bing EU policies mobilize cross-national bases of support that raise the cost of change by reversaling or significantly revising them. Both factors vary across issue countries, and we should therefore expect fluctuation in the stableness and path-dependent character of EU establishments and policies. To take one illustration, the EU structural financess might at first glimpse seem to be an ideal campaigner for path-dependent behavior, much like the CAP. By contrast with the CAP, nevertheless, the structural financess must be reauthorized at periodic intervals by a consentaneous understanding among the member provinces, giving fractious provinces periodic chances to blackball their continuance. Furthermore, because the structural financess are explicitly framed as redistributive reassigning money from rich provinces and parts to hapless 1s, we see an uneven form of trust upon and support for the structural financess among member provinces and their citizens. The practical consequence of these differences is that EU authoritiess have been able to reform the structural financess more readily, and with less incidence of path-dependence, than we find in the CAP, which has so resisted all but the most incremental alteration ( see Chapters 7 and 9 ) . In amount, for both rational-choice and historical institutionalists, EU establishments # 8216 ; affair # 8217 ; , determining both the policy procedure and policy results in predictable ways, and so determining the long-run procedure of European integrating. In both instances, nevertheless, the effects of EU establishments are assumed to act upon merely the inducements facing the assorted public and private actors-the histrions themselves are assumed to stay unchanged in their cardinal penchants and individualities. Indeed, despite their differences on substantial issues, broad intergovernmentalism, rational-choice institutionalism, and most historical institutionalism arguably constitute a shared positivist research agenda-a community of bookmans runing from similar basic premises and seeking to prove hypotheses about the most of import determiners of European integrating. Constructivism, and reshaping European individualities and penchants Constructivism, and reshaping European individualities and penchants Constructivist theory did non get down with the survey of the EU-indeed, as Thomas Risse ( 2004 ) points out in an first-class study, constructivism came to EU surveies comparatively late, with the publication of a particular issue of the Journal of European Public Policyon the # 8216 ; Social Construction of Europe # 8217 ; in 1999. Yet since so constructivist theoreticians have been speedy to use their theoretical tools to the EU, assuring to cast visible radiation on its potentially profound effects on the peoples and authoritiess of Europe. Constructivism is a notoriously hard theory to depict compactly. Indeed, like rational pick, constructivism is non a substantial theory of European integrating at all, but a broader # 8216 ; meta-theoretical # 8217 ; orientation with deductions for the survey of the EU. As Risse ( 2004: 161 ) explains: [ I ] T is likely most utile to depict constructivism as based on a societal ontology which insists that human agents do non be independently from their societal environment and its jointly shared systems of significances ( # 8216 ; civilization # 8217 ; in a wide sense ) . This is in contrast to the methodological individuality of rational pick harmonizing to which # 8216 ; [ t ] he simple unit of societal life is the single human action # 8217 ; . The cardinal penetration of the agency-structure argument, which lies at the bosom of many societal constructivist plants, is non merely that constructions and agents are reciprocally co-determined. The important point is that constructivists insist on the constitutivenessof ( societal ) constructions and agents. The societal environment in which we find ourselves, # 8216 ; constitutes # 8217 ; who we are, our individualities as societal existences. ( mentions removed ) For constructivists, establishments are understood loosely to i nclude non merely formal regulations but besides informal norms, and these regulations and norms are expected to # 8216 ; constitute # 8217 ; histrions, i. e. to determine their individualities and their penchants. Actor penchants, hence, are non exogenously given and fixed, as in positivist theoretical accounts, but endogenousto establishments, and persons # 8217 ; individualities shaped and re-shaped by their societal environment. Taking this statement to its logical decision, constructivists by and large reject the rationalist construct of histrions as utility-maximizers runing harmonizing to a # 8216 ; logic of consequentiality # 8217 ; , in favor of March and Olsen # 8217 ; s ( 1989: 160-2 ) construct of a # 8216 ; logic of rightness # 8217 ; . In this position, histrions facing a given state of affairs do non confer with a fixed set of penchants and cipher their actions in order to maximise their expected public-service corporation, but look to socially constructed fun ctions and institutional regulations and inquire what kind of behavior is appropriate in that state of affairs. Constructivism, hence, offers a basically different position of human bureau from rational-choice attacks, and it suggests that establishments influence single individualities, penchants, and behavior in more profound ways than those hypothesized by rational-choice theoreticians. A turning figure of bookmans has argued that EU establishments form non merely the behavior, but besides the penchants and individualities of persons and member authoritiess ( Sandholtz 1993 ; J # 1096 ; rgensen 1997 ; Lewis 1998 ) . This statement has been put most forcefully by Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik J # 1096 ; rgensen, and Antje Wiener in their debut to the particular issue of the Journal of European Public Policy (1999: 529 ) : A important sum of grounds suggests that, as a procedure, European integrating has a transformative impact on the European province system and its constitutional units. European integrating itself has changed over the old ages, and it is sensible to presume that in the procedure agents # 8217 ; individuality and later their involvements have every bit changed. While this facet of alteration can be theorized within constructivist positions, it will stay mostly unseeable in attacks that neglect procedures of individuality formation and/or assume involvements to be given endogenously. In other words, the writers begin with the claim that the EU is so reshaping national individualities and penchants, and reject positivist attacks for their inability to foretell and explicate these phenomena. Not surprisingly, constructivist histories of the EU have been forcefully rebutted by positivist theoreticians ( Moravcsik 1999 ; Checkel and Moravcsik 2001 ) . Harmonizing to Moravcsik ( 1999: 670 ) constructivist theoreticians raise an interesting and of import set of inquiries about the effects of European integrating on persons and provinces. Yet, he argues, constructivists have failed to do a important part to our empirical apprehension of European integrating, for two grounds. First, constructivists typically fail to build # 8216 ; distinct confirmable hypotheses # 8217 ; , choosing alternatively for wide interpretative models that can do sense of about any possible result, and are hence non capable to disproof through empirical analysis. Second, even if constructivists dopostulate hypotheses that are in rule confirmable, they by and large do non explicate and prove those hypotheses so as to separate clearly between constructivist anticipations and their positivist opposite numbers. Until constructivists test their hypotheses, and do so against prevailing and distinguishable positivist theoretical accounts, he argues, constructivism will non come down # 8216 ; from the clouds # 8217 ; ( Checkel and Moravcsik 2001 ) . Constructivists might react that Moravcsik privileges rational-choice accounts and sets a higher criterion for constructivist hypotheses ( since rational-choice bookmans typically do non try to prove their ain hypotheses against viing constructivist preparations ) . Many # 8216 ; post-positivist # 8217 ; bookmans, furthermore, difference Moravcsik # 8217 ; s image of EU surveies as # 8216 ; scientific discipline # 8217 ; , with its attendant claims of objectiveness and of an aim, cognizable universe. For such bookmans, Moravcsik # 8217 ; s name for confirmable hypothesis-testing appears as a power-laden demand that # 8216 ; non-conformist # 8217 ; theories play harmonizing to the regulations of a positivist, and chiefly American, societal scientific discipline ( J # 1096 ; rgensen 1997: 6-7 ) . To the extent that constructivists do so reject positivism and the systematic testing of viing hypotheses, the rationalist/constructivist argument would look to hold reached a # 8216 ; metatheoretical # 8217 ; impasse-that is to state, constructivists and positivists fail to hold on a common criterion for judging what constitutes support for one or another attack. In recent old ages, nevertheless, an increasing figure of constructivist theoreticians have embraced positivism-the impression that constructivist hypotheses can, and should, be tested and validated or falsified empirically-and these bookmans have produced a batch of constructivist work that attempts strictly to prove hypotheses about socialisation, norm-diffusion, and corporate penchant formation in the EU ( Wendt 1999 ; Checkel 2003 ; Risse 2004: 160 ) . Some of these surveies, including Liesbet Hooghe # 8217 ; s ( 2002, 2005 ) extended analysis of the attitudes of Commission functionaries, and several surveies of national functionaries take parting in EU commissions ( Beyers and Dierickx 1998 ; Egeberg 1999 ) , use quantitative methods to prove hypotheses about the nature and determiners of functionaries # 8217 ; attitudes, including socialisation in national every bit good as European establishments. Such surveies, undertaken with methodological cogencies and with a blunt cover age of findings, seem to show that that EU-level socialisation, although non excluded, plays a comparatively little function by comparing with national-level socialisation, or that EU socialisation interacts with other factors in complex ways. Other surveies, including Checkel # 8217 ; s ( 1999, 2003 ) survey of citizenship norms in the EU and the Council of Europe, and Lewis # 8217 ; s ( 1998, 2003 ) analysis of decision-making in the EU # 8217 ; s Coreper, utilize qualitative instead than quantitative methods, but are likewise designed to prove confirmable hypotheses about whether, and under what conditions, EU functionaries are socialized into new norms, penchants, and individualities. As a consequence, the metatheoretical gulf dividing positivists and constructivists appears to hold narrowed well, and EU bookmans have arguably led the manner in facing and-possibly-reconciling the two theoretical attacks. Three bookmans ( Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel 2003 ) have late put forward a model for advancing integrating of-or at least a fruitful duologue between-rationalist and constructivist attacks to international dealingss. Rationalism and constructivism, the writers argue, are non hopelessly incommensurate, but can prosecute each other through # 8216 ; four distinguishable manners of theoretical conversation # 8217 ; , viz. : competitory testing, in which viing theories are pitted against each other in explicating a individual event or category of events ; a # 8216 ; sphere of application # 8217 ; attack, in which each theory is considered to explicate some sub-set of empirical world, so that, for illustration, utility-maximizing and strategic bargaining obtain in certain fortunes, while socialisation and corporate penchant formation obtain in others ; a # 8216 ; sequencing # 8217 ; attack, in which one theory may assist explicate a peculiar measure in a sequence of actions ( e. g. a constructivist account of national penchants ) while another theory might outdo explain subsequent developments ( e. g. a rationalist account of subsequent bargaining among the histrions ) ; and # 8216 ; incorporation # 8217 ; or # 8216 ; minor premise # 8217 ; , in which one theory claims to subsume the other so that, for illustration, rational pick becomes a sub-set of human behavior finally explicable in footings of the societal building of modern reason. Looking at the substantial empirical work in their particular issue, Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel ( 2003 ) find that most parts to the rationalist/constructivist argument utilize competitory testing, while merely a few ( see, for illustration, Schimmelfennig 2003a) have adopted sphere of application, sequencing, or minor premise attacks. However, they see significant advancement in the argument, in which both sides by and large accept a common criterion of empirical testing as the standard for utile speculating about EU political relations. Integration theory today Integration theory today European integrating theory is far more complex than it was in 1977 when the first edition of this volume was published. In topographic point of the traditional neo-functionalist/ intergovernmentalist argument, the 1990s witnessed the outgrowth of a new duality in EU surveies, opposing rationalist bookmans against constructivists. During the late 1990s, it appeared that this argument might good turn into a metatheoretical duologue of the deaf, with positivists disregarding constructivists as # 8216 ; soft # 8217 ; , and constructivists denouncing positivists for their obsessional committedness to parsimoniousness and formal theoretical accounts. The past several old ages, nevertheless, have witnessed the outgrowth of a more productive duologue between the two attacks, and a steady watercourse of empirical surveies leting us to judge between the viing claims of the two attacks. Furthermore, whereas the neo-functionalist/intergovernmentalist argument was limited about entirely to the survey of European integration,3 the modern-day rationalist/ constructivist argument in EU surveies mirrors larger arguments among those same schools in the broader field of international dealingss theory. Indeed, non merely are EU surveies relevantto the wider survey of international dealingss, they are in many ways the vanguardof international dealingss theory, in so far as the EU serves as a research lab for broader procedures such as globalisation, institutionalization, and socialisation. Despite these significant steps of advancement, nevertheless, the literature on European integrating has non produced any consensus on the likely future way of the integrating procedure. At the hazard of overgeneralising, more optimistic theoreticians tend to be drawn from the ranks of neo-functionalists and constructivists, who point to the potency for farther integrating, the former through functional and political spillovers, and the latter through gradual alterations in both # 1081 ; lite and mass individualities and penchants as a consequence of drawn-out and productive cooperation. In empirical footings, these analysts often point to the rapid development of new establishments and policies in the 2nd and 3rd pillars, and the increasing usage of the alleged # 8216 ; unfastened method of coordination # 8217 ; ( OMC ) to turn to issues that had been beyond the range of EU competency. Rationalist and intergovernmentalist critics, on the other manus, tend to be doubting sing clai ms of both spill-over and socialisation, indicating to the hapless record of Commission entrepreneurship over the past decennary and the thin grounds for socialisation of national functionaries into European penchants or individualities, observing that the Commission has proven to be a hapless stimulator of political spill-over in recent old ages. For these bookmans, the EU may good stand for an # 8216 ; equilibrium civil order # 8217 ; , one in which functional force per unit areas for farther integrating are basically spent, and in which the current degree of institutional and policy integrating is improbable to alter well for the foreseeable hereafter ( Moravcsik 2001: 163 ) .

13 Tough Skills You Must Master to Find Career Success

13 Tough Skills You Must Master to Find Career Success The best things in life often require you to exit your comfort zone. Career success doesn’t come easily; otherwise, everyone would shoot to the top of their field fresh our of college! Here are 13 of the skills which are perhaps the hardest to learn, but are the most worth learning. Do yourself a favor and accrue a few.1. Sleeping SoundlyIf you can establish a ritual and stick with it, you’ll never need the ever popular â€Å"sleep hacks† everyone is scrambling around for. It may be tough to get into a routine, but you will never regret it.2. EmpathyIt’s a hard one to learn, but not impossible. And it’s incredibly valuable–both in the business world and in your personal life. If you can cultivate this kind of ability to feel what it might be like in others’ shoes, you will go far.3. Time ManagementThat thing you parents were always on at you about? Turns out it’s pretty important. There’s no one right way to gain this ski ll, but as long as you find a system that works for you consistently, you’re golden. Employers will notice and be impressed.4. Asking for  HelpKnowing when you’re in over your own head and need a hand is a very important thing. Being able to ask for that help is the next big thing. But both are invaluable. This is a tough one to break, but invariably makes you look more capable, rather than less.5. ConsistencyDo you have a tendency to take your foot off the gas when you reach the next milestone? This is career death. You have to work hard and keep working hard. That’s how the most successful people get where they are.6. Staying PositiveAnd not just about others- about yourself! Projecting confidence and cultivating positivity is very important. There will be times when no one else believes in you, but you should! Always.7. Knowing When to Shut UpIf you’re whining or ranting or just talking about your kids, it’s always important to know when your audience has had enough, and to be able to shut your mouth and cede the mic. Plus, learning to bite your tongue when riled and in danger of saying something you’ll later come to regret is an important skill.8. ListeningStart by practicing active listening- repeating back part of what the other person says to you, until you get more comfortable actually listening to what people are saying instead of waiting to say your next thing instead.9. Minding your Own BeeswaxKnow when to shut up and also when something is none of your concern. Your two cents aren’t always worth putting in. Know when to use your resources in someone else’s work and when to conserve them- for the benefit of all.10. Avoiding  GossipIt’s delicious and seductive to fall into the trap of talking about someone behind their back, but it can have disastrous consequences for your reputation and relationships. Learn to keep it classy and keep your head above the fray.11.  Controlling Your T houghtsDon’t let your own monkey brain or your emotions get the better of you. Continually direct your thinking toward the future, even if it is informed by the past. Move forward.12. Being PresentPeople are constantly looking into greener pastures, dwelling in the past, or looking too far forward that they don’t remember to be present in the present moment. Focus on where you are and what you are doing and try to find happiness in that moment. If you can do it now, you’ll be able to do it in the future.13. Speaking UpNinety percent of the battle of public speaking comes from doing it a few times- until you’re not so much afraid of it. But once you get comfortable speaking in public, whether in a small meeting or a huge amphitheater, you’ll be in possession of a huge asset that will stand you well in other areas of your life and career as well.

The Position of the Modern Woman Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

The Position of the Modern Woman - Essay Example However, the various feminist theories differ, to a large extent, on the sources and types of inequality suffered by women, how to tackle these inequalities and achieve equality or the extent to which gender and sexual identities should be questioned. Obviously, as with every ideology, political movement or philosophy, no single definition or idea would adequately reflect what feminism stands for (Tong, 1989). Â  Nonetheless, despite the various differences within the rank of the feminists’ movements, over the last couple of decades, their analysis and ideas have greatly contributed to society and social theory and thus have greatly improved the lives of women. Several aspects of private life associated with male/female social relationships have experienced changes and many parts of social life have been transformed as a result of the work of feminism. Although some people argue that there is still a long way to go before equality is attained between men and women, everyone agrees to the fact that major changes have been experienced towards such equality in the society (Burt and Dorney, 1993). Â  Somehow, men and women through their social actions and interactions have played a role in the changes experienced in the society, feminist theorist and writers have played the most striking roles in the changes in views and attitudes and other societal changes. Feminist theories have always been very useful in that, they tend to address the practical issues faced by women in their daily living and interaction with the society (Sydie, 1987).

Media representation of womens body. The change in advertising from Research Proposal

Media representation of womens body. The change in advertising from skinny models to everyday women - Research Proposal Example The Research proposal proves vital for the well being of all women. Just imagine Michael Angelo sculpting an Ally McBeal? Or Rembrandt painting Naomi Campbell? Or even Jane Austen portraying her female protagonist Elizabeth in beautiful gowns with nothing but bones and skin over her body? Besides saving Marble for the statue, paint and material for the painting, and word space to describe her heroine, there seems little achievement in choosing such models to depict the concept of beautiful women, in the field of art, literature or society, be it in the early 1500 century or the 21 century we are living in. But that was a time when there was nothing like the modern media. The society had scope to think for itself. Forms of expressions were for betterment of society and were devoid of manipulations. They were close to reality and in genuine proximity to nature unlike today. Women were a focus of every society although perspectives of representations of females have undergone catastrophic changes through the far reaching tentacles of the seductive, tantalizing and captivating media of modern consumerism and the capitalistic society. Buxom Belles represented beauty and prosperity. The Milkmaid by J Vermeer is admired as a masterpiece of art even today. Not only because of its excellence in painting skills and the superb realistic effects in the painting but also because of the daily life maid, the bulky but beautiful model he has chosen for his painting. Religions the world over revered the natural status of women for child bearing and rearing. Medical fields respected natural biology and the unique metabolism of humans. Sociologists acknowledge the well being of women to be a vital part of a healthy society in a nation. Anthropologists reported buxom bodied women as highly regarded females in native cultures of the world.

E-Commerce Coursework Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words

E-Commerce - Coursework Example - Sale staffs need to meet the clients in person to give a demonstration of the software and install them on clients computers, therefore lots of time and energy is wasted (for example in the traffic, because the company is close to a busy area). The company headquarters are seeking ways to sell the products and services online through a website. This way, the sale staff can stay in their offices provide support using telephone, email or even video conferencing. Clients will be able to find the details of the products and services online and at any time they need. - The research and development staffs do not see a necessity to be present at the office every single day. They are already working together through a computer network. They prefer a system to allow them secure access to the company’s website and work and communicate with other developers online. They need a space to securely share and update the files and get them to work altogether. - The company at the moment has more software staff than programmers. These staffs are the persons that need to meet every single client and help them with installing and using the software. Headquarters are thinking of providing support through a website with a complete help and support section since the number of clients is increasing every day. Electronic commerce is about using the internet for purchasing/selling products/services online. The number of internet users is increasing every single day and electronic commerce is representing itself as a real opportunity for companies to find new markets and provide their good and services more efficiently to their existing clients. There are enormous benefits for a company like Ictbuild Ltd. by using an e-commerce system. For example they will gain the access to the global market, they can sell their software, hardware and services without the need of middleman businesses and they can save time and energy for their sale staff. Apart from that,

Globalisation Of Culture Global Culture Cultural Studies Essay

Globalisation Of Culture Global Culture Cultural Studies Essay Thus, globalization is often constructed as an impersonal and inevitable force in order to justify certain policies or behaviors, however praiseworthy some of them might be. In a broader historical sense, Mazlish (1993:6-7) and Robertson (1992:68-71) cogently argue that not only capitalism or advocacy movements but also Christianity, Islam, and Marxism have made global claims and harbored global pretensions. The start of globalization is also a contested issue (Held et al. 1999). World-system theorists maintain that the expansion of European capitalism in the 16th century marks the start of globalization (Wallerstein 1974; see also Waters 1995:2-4). Robertson (1992:179) argues that globalization took off between 1875 and 1925 with the time-zoning of the world and the establishment of the international dateline; the near-global adoption of the Gregorian calendar and the adjustable seven-day week; and the establishment of international telegraphic and signaling codes. term globalization was first used around 1960 in its world-wide sense as opposed to its much older meanings of the global as something sphericalor universal. It is far from a uniform and inexorable trend. Rather, globalization is a fragmented, incomplete, discontinuous, contingent, and in many ways contradictory and puzzling process (Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald 1999; Held et al. 1999:43proponents of the feeble thesis focus almost exclusively on the economic and financial aspects of globalization to the detriment of political, social and cultural ones. The literature offers and discuss evidence in support of political and cultural globalization that is, on the whole, qu ite persuasive. (Castells 1996:66-147) The anthropologist Jonathan Friedman (1994:210-211) asserts that globalization is the product of cultural fragmentation as much as it is the result of modernist homogeneity, and that what appears as disorganization and often real disorder is not any the less systemic and systematic. At the ideological and cultural level, globalization has been observed as a symptom of late imperial culture as Aijaz Ahmad calls it as the most recent and highest stage of imperialism (Ahmad: 2002). Does Globalisation Produce Convergence? A second contested issue in the literature on globalization has to do with its consequences as to the convergence of societies towards a uniform pattern of economic, political, and even cultural organization. Most famously expressed in modernization theory, the spread of markets and technology is predicted to cause societies to converge from their preindustrial past, although total homogeneity is deemed unlikely. The critique of the presumed convergent consequences of globalization. Political scientist Robert Cox (1996:28, 30 n. 1) writes that the social and ethical content of the economy may be organized differently in various parts of the world. Historian Bruce Mazlish (1993:4) argues that no single global history is anticipated. So It should be noted that some sociologists reject the very terms of the convergence debate by arguing that globalization homogenizes without destroying the local and the particularistic. For example, Viviana Zelizer (1999) argues that the economyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ differentiates and proliferates culturally in much the same way as other spheres of social life do, without losing national and even international connectedness. Thus, globalization is not seen as precluding or contradicting diversity. Like Zelizer, Robertson (1995:34-35) sees the global as the linking of localities. A final aspect of the convergence controversy has to do with the impact of globalization on inequality across and within countries. The evidence unambiguously indicates that there is today more inequality across countries than ten, twenty, fifty or even one hundred years ago. Stunningly, the gap in per capita income between rich and developing countries has grown five-fold between 1870 and 1990 (Pritchett 1997; Temple 1999). There are, however, several noteworthy developing countries that have managed to close half or more of the gap since 1960, e.g. South Korea, Taiwan, and Ireland. Very few developing countries, however, have consistently grown faster than the most advanced ones since 1980. Thus, development levels appear not to be converging as a result of globalization. By contrast to cross-national UNDERSTANDING CULTURE: What is culture? Culture is itself is diacritical rather than a substantive concept. In Frederick Jamesons words, culture is not a substance or a phenomenon in its own right, it is an objective mirage that arises out of the relationship between atleast two groups.No group has a culture all by itself: culture is the nimbus percieved by one group when it comes into contact with and observes another one. In a globalise economy culture is deemed as a matter of choice as much as of inheritance, and thus as a potentially less oppressive, and hence less politicising, category of identification than colour or ethnicity, class or gender. (See, Bennette, 1993:3-4) CULTURE AND GLOBALISATION: Global Culture When we talk about globalisation, we are in a sense talking about unity of the states across the globe. How this unity is brought up? Then how does it link the states together? What are the major contributors in this unification process? Along with a myriad of intellectuals I will also sum- up with an answer, global- culture. However, it is one of the measures required for the unification process. One set of theorists, who are pro-global- culture say, that the global culture is making the world closer and more united. The people of the world are combining their differences and being more cooperative towards one and other. This process of emerging global culture can be seen in times of need when everyone has pulled together to strive for peace and freedom. Although, there exists a wide range of religions of which people are becoming tolerant, forming a homogenised society. On the other hand there are also philosophers who scorn global culture for the reason, that the local culture and morality are all at stake. If we say that the global culture is the synonym of the common culture, then there are wide range of opinion on it. Wight uses the term common culture so loosely that it is unclear whether he has in mind a deep, historic sense of culture, or the more superficial agreed rules that compose a contractual society. (James 1993: 277-8) Alan James, System or society?, Review of International Studies 19: 3, 1993. I argue that to certain extent global culture is a common culture among the people of the world. Further, Appadurai, Arjun in Difference in global cultural economy talks about five dimensions of the global culture 1) ethnoscape, 2) technoscape, 3)medioscape, 4) finanscape and 5) ideoscape. Origin of Global Culture: To get through the idea of the origin of the global culture, I am at consensus with Barry Buzan, the way he differentiates the origin of the global culture by the way of Vanguardist and Syncretist accounts. Vanguardist account emphasizes the centrality of Europe in the expansion story and projects a rather one-way view of cultural transmission from the West to the rest of the world. The Syncretist account puts more emphasis on the interplay of civilizations during the expansion process, and takes a more fluid and interactive view of cultural transmission generally. (Buzan:3 ) Buzan says, that before working through these two accounts and their consequences, it helps to keep in mind that prior to them there are two models of expansion by which a global international society could have evolved from the late classical world. In that world there were several centres of civilization whose degree of contact with each other ranged from quite intense (the Islamic world with both Christendom and the Hindu world) through fairly thin (Christendom and China) to more or less absent (the civilizations of Eurasia and those of Meso-America and the Andean highlands). From that starting point, one way of reaching a global-scale international society would have been for the various civilizational cores of the classical world to expand into increased contact with each other, so requiring that they develop rules of the game to mediate their relations in a polycentric international society. In such a case, global international society would have developed on the basis of cultu ral diversity, perhaps along the lines shown by the Indian Ocean trading system before the European arrival. The other way would have been the takeover of the whole system by one civilizational core, the imposition of one culture on the others, and the absorption of all the others into its particular rules, norms and institutions. This monocentric model is close to most historical accounts of what actually happened. (Buzan: 3) . In Vanguardist terms, the development of a global interstate society has been almost entirely a function of the expansion of the West. From the sixteenth century onwards, the rise of European power quickly crushed the two civilizational areas in the Americas and eroded, and eventually overwhelmed, the four in Eurasia. By the end of the nineteenth century virtually the whole of the international system was recreated in the image of Europe, as in the Americas and Australia; or directly subordinated to Europe, as in the African and Asian colonies; or desperatel y trying to catch up with Europe in order to avoid being colonized, as in the few most resilient parts of the classical world: the Ottoman empire, Japan and China. The triumph of European power meant not only that a sharp and permanent rise in the level of interaction took place, but also that western values and institutions-the so-called standard of civilization-dominated the whole system in imperial fashion. This mixture of coercion and copying runs in close parallel to Kenneth Waltzs idea that anarchy generates like units through processes of socialisation and competition. (Waltz 1979:74-79) Looking at this process in Wendtian terms.(Wendt 1999: 247-50) outsiders might emulate the core because of direct coercion, or by calculation or consent. Whatever the mechanisms and whatever the rationales, the effect is one of a sub-global Vanguard remaking the world in its own political image. This account rests on a sharp distinction between West and non-West, and less sharp differentiations among the different cultures and civilizations within the non-West. It has parallels with other stories of expanding imperial cultures where westernization is a similar process to Sinification, Romanization, Russification, Islamization and suchlike. In explaining the breakout of one culture to dominate others, a Vanguardist account inevitably puts a lot of emphasis on cultural difference generally, and on the exceptionalism of the Vanguard culture in particular. As in much nineteenth-century European imperial discourse, exceptionalism easily drifts not only into a ranking of cultures from superior to inferior (civilized, barbarian, savage) but also into a racist ranking of peoples as superior and inferior. (Hobson 2004: 219-42) Because it rests on differences of both culture and power. (Buzan:6) Robert ONeill and John Vincent also noted the unequal relations between the West and the Third World and the consequent regional diversity of international society, with some Third World unity around non-alignment, development, and the elimination of colonialism and racism. (O Neill 1990: 283-5) The challenges to the West come in two forms. The first is that non-western powers manage to reduce inequality by developing, and then use their new power both to assert different cultural values and to resist the solidarist western values of human rights, democracy and the liberal market. The West has lost the dominance of the second phase, and its prospect is one of continued relative decline as countries like China, India and Iran acquire the elements of modernity, and the corresponding power, that the West has made available. Its only hope is that the homogenizing effects of capitalist development will reduce cultural difference at the same time as they redistribute power. But if culture is viewed in essentialist terms as more or less fixed, then in terms of the instability hypothesis the move to a multicultural foundation and a redistribution of power spells permanent trouble and weakness for international society. (Buzan: 7) The second type of challenge comes not from opposition combined with strength, but from weakness, whether oppositional or not. Part of the legacy of decolonization is an array of weak and failed polities that are unable to play their part in the game of states. Somalia, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan and other notional states represent holes in the fabric of international society. Their levels of internal disorder make it difficult to pursue the western agenda within them, and provide bases for criminals and terrorists acting against the West. (Buzan: 7) The Syncretist account is based on the idea that it is the normal condition of human affairs for cultural ideas to flow between areas of civilization. Cultures thus evolve not only in response to their own internal dynamics, but also because of encounters with other cultures, even remote ones. The Syncretist account challenges the strong Vanguardist distinction between West and non-West, and its corollaries of w estern exceptionalism and superiority. (Buzan: 11) Rather than European international society emerging pristine out of a unique and self-contained European civilization, in the Syncretist account the development phase in Europe involves very significant interaction with the other civilizations of Eurasia and North Africa. As Wight notes, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the crusades brought Europe into close contact with the Islamic world, adding to the contact already created by the earlier Islamic occupation of Spain, the two episodes together serving as the channel for the acculturation of medieval Christendom. (Wight: 52). Almost at the same time, the Mongol conquest of much of Eurasia brought Europe into contact with China and enabled increased transmission of ideas. The rise of the Ottoman empire from the late thirteenth century, and its conquest of Constantinople in 1453, meant that a rising Europe was neighbour to, and in regular contact with, a hostile and powerf ul non-European culture. Given that classical Greece is sometimes used as a comparator for Europe in discussions of the relationship between culture and international society, it is a nice irony that the Ottoman modifier to the story of a pristine European development runs in close parallel to the way in which the Persian empire shared a system with the city states of classical Greece, initially as the greater power, and then as the victim of Greek expansion. (Wight: 46-109). To sum up: the Syncretist view is that culture and international society are both malleable. They can and do change; cross-cultural interactions are the normal condition of international society, and flow in many directions. The Syncretist account suggests that for two reasons there is less cultural difference between the West and the rest of the world than the Vanguardist account supposes. First, the emergence of European international society was not a pristine process but took place during a long period of s ustained cultural interaction with the other civilizations of Eurasia and North Africa. (Buzan: 19) This outcome envisages the triumph of the Vanguardist process. Either the Vanguard displaces and replaces other cultures, or it converts the rest of the world to its own standard of civilization, creating a universal culture based on a widespread acceptance of Western values, practices and institutions. We know that replacement did not and will not happen, so this outcome now rests on the success of westernization. The degree of cultural unity necessary to stabilize international society would come from the success of westernization, and would go a long way towards mitigating the contradiction between hegemonic practice and the legitimating principle of sovereign equality in present-day international society. This outcome would eliminate OHagans tension as to whether international society represents the values of a dominant culture or a neutral mode of communication across cultures. This outcome envisages the triumph of cultural mixing and adaptation. It is therefore in principle not wedded to any particular set of values, practices and institutions, but is normatively open, allowing these to emerge in the syncretic process. In practice, since the Syncretist account largely accepts the monocentric model, the actual homogenization would reflect the considerable success that the West has already had in projecting onto other cultures many of its values, practices and institutions: sovereignty, diplomacy, nationalism, the market and so on. The expectation here is also that international society will be strong and fairly uniform at the global level, but not exclusively based on western values. Rather, some mixture will emerge as western power wanes and the power and influence of non-western cultures rise. Here too we can find those who think that homogenization will result from the global operation of capitalism, though in this version the undoubted cultural carrying capacity of the global market will work both ways, with the West being as transformed as transforming by the cultural flows across the planet. There is plenty of Syncretist evidence to point to here, from the popularity of Asian food, fashion and film, and This outcome envisages the partial failure of both the Vanguardist project and the process of Syncretism. Such failure might occur for various reasons. The West might lose power before it can convert the rest. Political and cultural resistance in the non-West might be strong, particularly against the more recent and more liberal elements of Western international society. Global- culture and Religion Whether societies are becoming less or more secular? is another point of debate, but in the present context, to a certain extent, the societies are becoming secular . Religion became a categorical model for the ordering of the national society and their relations during nineteenth and early twentieth century. So it became an aspect of International law. The argument I want to raise here is there is a distinction between the culture and the religion? Some equate, culture with the civilisation and inturn, civilisation with the religion; which is not true practically. During seventies and eightees there were church and state conflict prevailing, in the same way as today we think of global culture and the religion. Here comes the issue of diffusion of the religion, and then its global- foci. I agree the way Robertson differentiates between the world and worldliness, on the similer terms as Max Weber does. (Robertson: 143) The major consequences of globalisation have been (1) the transmogrification of traditional religions and belief systems; (2) the beginning of the disintegration of the traditional social fabrics and shared norms by the invasion of consumerism, cyber- culture, newfangled religions, social fads, and changing work ethics and work rhythms; (3) the fast spreading anomie (in the Durkhemian sense) forcing an ever increasing number of individuals to fall back upon for moral and social support the easily accessible pretentious religious banalities; and (4) attributing to religion the creation and acceleration of extremist, fundamentalist, and terrorist tendencies in the third world countries, which are intended to destabilise them, and strike at the root of their civilisation, and multicultural and pluralist nature. (Radhakrishnan: 1403) The nature and functions of religion in society have been Under speculation and discourse for several centuries; the approaches to the understanding of religion philosophical, theological, anthropological, sociological and the related dimensions of religious ideas have been very old; and the nexus between religion and society has been very close, with wide, complex, intricate and elaborate ramifications: The role of religion in giving spiritual and moral sustenance to individuals, the related regulation of social life and moral order, creating and regulating cultural forms, and the inte- gration of society. One may go with the French sociologist Emile Durkheims postulate (endorsed by, among others, the English anthropologist A R Radcliffe-Brown) that the main role (or function) of religion [is] to celebrate and sustain the norms upon which the integration of society depends [Geertz 1968: 402]. While on religion and globalisation, it is important to know whether globalisation unites or divides religions; results in newfangled religions; and has a direct nexus with fundamentalism and religion-linked terrorism. It is also important to ascertain whether for its new imperialist project globalisation has been exploiting different religious forms; whether fundamentalism and religion-inspired terrorism have increased since the advent of globalisation; and whether religions, far from being belief sys- tems in their traditional sense, have spawned new dimensions which are far removed from the spiritual and religious realms. (Radhakrishnan : 1406) Challenges to the global culture: For Transnational corporations, However there are signs evidencing that the national culture no longer affects companies, when they enter other markets, because new global rules are becoming more important instead. Instances of Global- culture: To my way of thinking and after reading so many scholars, I come up with the following instances, which evidence the emergence of the global culture. People are having a shared belief of freedom, and safety across the globe. All do have some common issues like Human Rights, environment protection, Freedoms, technology- savvy practices, feminist issues, health- issues and all other who make the whole world unified in claiming them. Global culture is also emerging slowly in parts of the world. For example, Europe used to have different forms of money and now they have switched to one shared currency, the euro-dollar. Although there are many different form of money throughout the world, someday that might change. The world is shrinking. The things which were common to one particular country or region are now accessible to the world at large. Like Italian, Chinese, Mexican And Indian food. The world commercial market has given rise to the trans- national corporations. Although arranged marriage persists in many cultures today, as modernization proceeds and many areas become part of the global economy, parental influences on marriage continue to decline. Young people who work for wages rather than on the familys land no longer depend as highly on their parents resources. As Western popular culture-including motion pictures, television, music, and fashion-spreads around the world, many young people are drawn to Western notions of love, romance, and individual choice. In some places, such as Japan, people combine modern Western and older cultural practices. For instance, parents and computer matchmaking services help find prospective mates, and the individuals can accept or reject the proposed match. Since its inception in the 1950s, rock music has moved from the margins of American popular music to become the center of a multi-billion-dollar global industry. Closely connected with youth culture, rock music and musicians have helped to establish new fashions, forms of language, attitudes, and political views. However, rock music is no longer limited to an audience of teenagers, since many current listeners formed their musical tastes during the golden age of rock and roll. Similarly, while rock has historically encouraged new creative expressions, the innovations of Chuck Berry, Elvis Presley, Bob Dylan, the Beatles, and Jimi Hendrix have defined a tradition to which successive generations of musicians have repeatedly turned for inspiration. Natural resources are conserved for their biological, economic, and recreational values, as well as their natural beauty and importance to local cultures. For example, tropical rain forests are protected for their important role in both global ecology and the economic livelihood of the local culture; a coral reef may be protected for its recreational value for scuba divers; and a scenic river may be protected for its natural beauty. The same is the case with conservation of Water, the whole world collectively is in favour of water conservation policies. Cultural exchanges, across the world, for example, the spread of islam or Christianity has been seen in last few years as increasing. Internationalisation of the Media like radio, television, newspaper and internet are linking together the world at large. Apperception of Western culture as an attribute of the world today, as an outcome of the global expansion of industrial capitalism, which for the first time integrated the world into a global system centered in Europe. Major constituent of Western culture have ceased to be ethnic and have become internationalized as intrinsic constituent of a world shaped by the development of the West. Even the idea of art as a self-sufficient activity based on aesthetics, is also a product of Westernisation. The traditional art of other cultures, as well as that of the West from earlier eons, was a different type of creation, determined by functions of a religious, representational, or commemorative nature. Is a Global Culture in the Making? Perhaps the most popular and controversial of the debates about globalization has to do with the rise of a global culture. Actually, there are only a few scholars who maintain that a global culture is in the making. The idea goes back to Marshall McLuhans slippery concept of the global village (McLuhan 1964) The global culture driven by symbols, images, and the aesthetic of the lifestyle and the self-image-has spread throughout the world and is having some momentous effects, including the standardization of tastes and desires, and even , anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1996:4, 21) argues that individuals and groups seek to annex the global into their own practices of the modern, and that consumption of the mass media worldwide provokes resistance, irony, selectivity, and, in general, agency. Some of the most persuasive arguments against the idea of the emergence of a global culture come from anthropologist Clifford Geertz. He observes that the world is growing both more global and more divided, more thoroughly interconnected and more intricately partitioned at the same time [à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦] Whatever it is that defines identity in borderless capitalism. And the global village it is not deep going agreements on deep going matters, but something more like the recurrence of familiar divisions, persisting arguments, standing threats, the notion that whatever else may happen, the order of difference must be somehow maintain (Geertz 1998:107-110). Like Geertz, sociologist Anthony Smith is skeptical, and notes an interesting initial problem with the concept of global culture: Can we speak of culture in the singular? If by culture is meant a collective mode of life, or a repertoire of beliefs, styles, values and symbols, then we can only speak of cultures, never just culture; fo r a collective mode of life [à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦] presupposes different modes and repertoires in a universe of modes and repertoires. Hence, the idea of a global culture is a practical impossibility, except in interplanetary terms (Smith 1990: 171). However, I argue that this notion is wrong, and the global culture is not only in existence, but it is flourishing as well. LOCAL versus GLOBAL Local culture and social structure are now shaped by large and powerful commercial interests in ways that earlier anthropologists could not have imagined. Early anthropologists thought of societies and their cultures as fully independent systems. But today, many nations are multicultural societies, composed of numerous smaller subcultures. Cultures also cross national boundaries. Some people fear a loss of cultural diversity as U.S. media companies become dominant. Such companies tend to bundle their products so that a blockbuster movie is promoted by selling soundtracks, books, video games, and other. However, the under- developed countries companies do not have such a control, even any sort of control over the market. On the one hand, as world beat became a more visible feature of the international popular musical landscape in the late 1980s and early 1990s, popular music scholars began to analyze its economic and cultural implications. Most analyses focused on the inequalities characterizing the bilateral relationships between north and south and accused the industry of exploiting Third World cultural resources. Others were concerned about the potentially disastrous consequences of homogenization and westernization upon folk cultures being swept up in and transformed by what has been called global culture flows. The most trenchant critics also charged the world music industry with racism, for ignoring the harsh realities of economic and political subordination experienced by Third World peoples of color, and instead constructing images of cultural authenticity in order to satisfy the desires of northern whites safely to consume exotic otherness. More optimistic observers, for example, have sugges ted that the powerful forces of cultural and economic hegemony are being resisted by culturally and technologically savvy Third World musicians who are taking control of the production of their own music, revitalizing local musical traditions by modernizing them. Furthermore, the international popular musical landscape, so long dominated by U.S. and European pop and rock, has unquestionably been diversified and enriched by the increased circulation of musics from multiple locations around the globe. To better understand the national and global linkages, Some observers would argue that it is inappropriate to distinguish Afro-Brazilian from Brazilian music, since black expressive cultures have contributed so profoundly to what is understood to be national culture. Perhaps no other artistic field in Brazil has been so deeply influenced by black cultures than popular music. Nevertheless, it is useful and necessary to identify distinct styles and movements in Brazilian popular music that are associated particularly with black urban communities. The past 20 years have seen the proliferation of Afro-Brazilian social, political, and cultural movements that explicitly reject the traditional belief in a unitary national culture. Yet, for the most part, contemporary Afro-Brazilian musical countercultures continue to be racially inclusive. An increasingly globalized world economy has intensified the influx of African and diasporic musical cultures, particularly from the United States and Ja maica, to major Brazilian cities. These forms of music and their attendant cultural styles, modes of dress, and dance steps have been widely appropriated and transformed by young urban Brazilians. Several broad currents in contemporary Afro-Brazilian music may be identified: contemporary samba, soul/funk/hip-hop, reggae, axà © music, and mangue beat. (See, Encarta) Another example of globalised music culture Samba emerged in the 20th century as the preeminent national music of Brazil. Modern urban samba was developed in the predominantly black favelas (shantytowns) on the morros (hills) of Rio de Janeiro, and now globalised. In addition to music, there are plethora of dancing style,

A Comparison Between The Works Of Amedeo Modigliani And Jacques Villon :: essays research papers

Italian-born Cubist painter, Amedeo Modigliani (1884-1920) and the French, Jacques Villon (1875-1963), both painted vibrant and expressive portraits during the early twentieth-century. In this case, the chosen portraits are Modigliani's "Portrait of Mrs. Hastings", 1915 and Villon's "Mme. Fulgence", 1936. Both of these compositions are portraits. Nothing is of more importance than the sitter herself. The female sitter in Modigliani's piece, sits in an almost dizzying pose with a twist in her elongated neck (a Modigliani trademark), a stylized and mask-like head and a columnar neck. All of which give the sitter a blank and ashen expression. She looks at the viewer, head-on with a most piercing air in her eyes. In Villon's case, his female sitter has been created solely with the use of layered colours and a very random synthetist outline technique (a similar technique the post-impressionist painter Gaugin used). Modigliani outlines his figure moreso in black than Villon. Mme. Fulgence's age is understood by the strong dynamic colour quality that has been used to break her face apart. In a way, these colourful divisions act as wrinkles. For instance, the chunk of layered pink on her lip creates a scowl and the heavily applied white on her nose helps it to seem upright; a 'snobbish' upturn. Colours such as the orange, have been used to highlight her left cheek and only visible ear. With these effects, the viewer sees Mme. Fulgence as a very proper and'posh' (if you will) woman. Bitterness is only a common linkage with the other attributes. Modigliani's Hastings on the other hand seems to be an intense woman of a compassionate nature. Both of these pieces have relied heavily on the expressive and wild use of colour to create emotional expressions and unerring form. Both of these portraits are created using oil paints--Modigliani's on cardboard and Villon's on canvas. The most important element that draws their work away from the mainstream is their heavy application of paint. Although they both apply their colour liberally, Modigliani's strokes are thick, jagged, and for the most part random. His brushstrokes are also particularly long, whereas Villon's are short and brief. Modigliani uses monochromatic hues of red to create the prominent colour of the piece and like Villon, he has used a very vague background to express the importance of his sitter. Colour is of equal importance in both pieces as it draws the viewer in and allows the viewer's eyes to be brought around the piece. Modigliani has split his background from top to bottom, using red and strokes of burnt sienna at first, then an auburn and deeper red for the bottom.

Primary Source Analysis of Message Drafted by General Eisenhower Essay

World War II is an infamous event in the history of the world. For almost 6 years, humankind was divided into two wherein one group was in favor for global domination and the other one was for democracy. The West and the East were completely enveloped with devastation and terror during this dark phase of the past. However, if World War II brought out the worse in people, it also proved that humans possessed an innate nature to be good and compassionate. It was just a matter of choice of whether doing the right and morally correct action or standing up for something that truly one believes in. Since WWII became a large-scale military conflict, much of the success of the defeat of the German, Japanese and Italian forces can be attributed to those who have selflessly dedicated their time, efforts and even lives for the restoration of freedom and peace. These people are the thousands of soldiers of the Allied forces. Without them, the liberation efforts in Europe and in Asia would not be successful. The most significant but very high-risk operation that was drafted by the Allied forces in advancing their goal of invading Germany and bringing to an end to the evil ways of Hitler and his supporters was the bold move of penetrating the German stronghold area in the southern coastline of France. This military operation has become known as â€Å"D-Day† which means based on military jargons as the commencement of any military operations. Since this momentous event, the Allied forces were given the opportunity to weaken the formidable military might of Hitler. As a result, the combined forces of the French, Canadians, English, Russian and Americans were able to conquer and defeat many strategic bulwarks of the enemies. Eventually, they were able to reach, seize and free the center of the Axis power in Europe which was Germany. After a year since the amphibious assault at Normandy, the whole of Europe celebrated to the new found democracy and independence. Prior to this relatively happy ending, there were a lot of political and military planning and failed missions that occurred. On the first half of WWII, the US did not take part in any direct efforts to combat communism and autocracy. But when the bombing at Pearl Harbor transpired, the US openly announced their wage in war with the Axis forces. One of the most prominent personalities during this era was an American General named General Dwight Eisenhower. His background in effective organization and implementation of military operations prompted him to be designated as the â€Å"Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. As the leader of all soldiers from various nationalities, he was burdened with the responsibility of devising a strategic plan that will advance the troops in liberating Europe from German occupation. The idea of orchestrating a large-scale attack on German territories that will have a high probability of victory was very challenging for Eisenhower. Though it was difficult, he was able to formulate a feasible plan together with an equally knowledgeable military man, Field Marsh al Bernard Montgomery. Then, Operation Overlord was born. According to history books, this plan was supposed to be more aggressive than their 1943 plan wherein only 3 divisions were supposed to be deployed in Europe. Because of the diversity in the leadership and manpower, Overlord acquired a multi-level approach in planning, organizing and implementing the invasion. Also, it was emphasized in historical writings that the masterminds of Overlord were confident that the alliance can pull off the plan despite the eminent threat of military resistance among the Germans in Normandy. The high command in the military needed to exude faith and confidence on their plans so that the soldiers who will fight in the battlefield will be motivated to do their respective tasks with peace of mind that everything will go according to plan. However, the second thoughts and doubts about Overlord from political and military officials were left unreported leaving the public at that time clueless about the possible worse scenarios that can happen. Then British Prime Minister Winston Churchill expressed his worries about the invasion in a German fortified beachhead in France. He was concerned about the catastrophic events that could manifest if the plan fails. It could cost thousands of lives of soldiers and tons of resources wasted which could produce a major setback for the Allied forces. Like Churchill, Eisenhower also felt that Overlord was a very ambitious endeavor that could lead to a complete disaster if anything goes wrong. In his â€Å"in case of failure† message dated July 5, Eisenhower expressed his concern over the potential outcomes of Overlord. Actually, it was believed to be written on June 5, a day before D-Day. He mentioned that the â€Å"landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area† were unsuccessful so another amphibious attack could also experience the same plight. But the interesting part about the message was the content and the tone. Eisenhower wanted the reader to feel that Operation Overlord was a plan derived from the only available sources that they could find combined with a situation wherein there was an increase of military troops being killed in German territories and because of that the military can only do so much. He was insinuating that the achievement of victory was not definite. However, he emphasized in his message that he was sole responsible and the one to blame if everything fails. In the last statement, â€Å"If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone,† demonstrated Eisenhower’s courage in accepting responsibility for conceptualizing, executing and remedying Overlord. On the other hand, this message was only read by Eisenhower’s â€Å"naval aide, Capt. Harry Butcher† but he never disclosed it to anyone until modern historians have found about it. Though Eisenhower was not 100% sure that Overlord was going to succeed, he and numeours soldiers proved that anything can be done even the impossible as long as dedication and bravery are present. The end of WWII in 1945 was the fruit of the many sacrifices of thousands of brave and courageous soldiers.

To see how long it takes the size of a hot object to cool down Essays

To see how long it takes the size of a hot object to cool down Essays To see how long it takes the size of a hot object to cool down Essay To see how long it takes the size of a hot object to cool down Essay Planning: I will make sure I devise a fair test by doing things correctly and fairly. The only variable I will be obtaining will be the temperature of the water at 80oc, and I will make sure it is fair by testing it with a thermometer. I will also make sure it is a fair test by adding more water into the bigger beakers because it wont all fit into the smaller ones so that will give the smaller beakers a fair chance as well, and I will measure the water in a measuring cylinder to make it fair.I will also make sure I devise a fair test by using a stopwatch to record the result every 30 seconds up to 2minutes, because it is more reliable and accurate. I will make sure it is fair when we record the results because when we get the temperature I will get a second opinion of my friend. I will also make sure my experiment is safe in all the possible ways I can. I will make sure we are safe by wearing rubber gloves just in case we spill some boiling water on our hands. Prediction: I predict that the bigger the beaker the faster it will cool, and the smaller the beaker the longer it will take to cool. I know this because of the Food Theory, the theory tells me that if there was a plate with a pile of hot food on it, it will take quite long for it to cool down, where as if you were to break that pile of hot food into smaller pieces of food then it will cool down much quicker because when you break it up you are giving it a bigger surface area so heat can escape around the sides, top and bottom. So therefore I think the same will happen with the beakers, but the bigger the beaker is obviously going to have a bigger surface area than the smaller beakers, where as in the theory the smaller food pieces have a bigger surface area than the pile of food, but that is because you cant break the beakers into pieces.Apparatus:* 4 different sized beakers* Water at 80oc* Kettle* Thermometer* Rubber Gloves* Stop watch* Pen Paper (for results)Method: First of all I got the equipment, which consists of 4 different sized beakers, a thermometer, a kettle, measuring cylinder and some water. Then I put the kettle on, when the water was boiled up to 80oc I measured it in the measuring cylinder and put the correct amount of water into the correct beaker, then we waited and every 30 seconds on the stop watch, we then measured the temperature of the water in the 4 beakers with a thermometer, then we recorded them on paper and plotted some graphs.Numbers and range: In total I will have 4 results for the 4 different sized beakers and for each beaker I will have two readings, and I will record the results every 30 seconds and at the end of all the results I will take away 2 minutes from 0 seconds for the first reading of the first beaker then I will do the same to the second reading for the first beaker then I will add them both and divide them by two which will give me an overall average for the first beaker, and I will carry that on for the next 3 be akers, in the end I should end up with 4 different averages with which I will plot a graph. Here are the 4 different beakers:BEAKER 1: The biggest with 150ml of waterBEAKER 2: The second biggest with 100ml of waterBEAKER 3: The third biggest with 75ml of waterBEAKER 4: The fourth biggest with 50ml of waterSafety: I will try and make my experiment safe by firstly wearing rubber gloves in case we spill the boiling water, secondly by consulting a teacher before and after we set up the experiment.CONCLUSIONCalculation: I calculated my averages by working out the difference between 2 minutes and 0 seconds for the first beaker and the first reading, then I did the first beaker and second reading, I then added the sums together and divided them by 2, to give me an average. I did this for the 3 other beakers as well. So I ended up with 4 overall averages.Pattern: I would say that a pattern did occur in both of my graphs, as you can see in the graphs labelled result 1 and result 2all the lin es go from a high temperature to a low one which shows that the temperatures did drop after some time, which was meant to happen, but then you see on graph result 1 the order from top to bottom is: beaker 1, beaker 4, beaker 2, beaker 3, which proves my prediction wrong about the bigger the beaker the faster it will cool, because beaker 4 is the smallest beaker and it cooled down faster than beaker 2 and 3, and also it starts off with beaker 1 which it should have, then it jumps straight to beaker4 which should be last, but then it carrys on as normal; beaker 2 and then beaker 3, so I think there was a problem within beaker 4. In the graph result 2 you can see the order from top to bottom is: beaker 3, beaker 1, beaker 2, beaker 4, so beaker 3 should be third but you can see that the rest is in order, so beaker 1, beaker 2, then it should have been beaker 3, then beaker 4, so I think there was a problem within beaker 3. In the graph labelled averages I think it all goes pear shaped, because the points are so far apart from each other, which made it harder for me to draw the line of best fit, you can also see the averages in order from highest temperature to lowest temperature is: beaker 2, beaker 4, beaker 1, beaker 3, so I think that because the averages have turned out like that and not how I expected which was beaker 1,2,3 and then 4, I think that the whole experiment must have went wrong from start to end.Evaluation: In my experiment I found that most of my results were quite off key, in the graphs result 1 and result 2 the orders were only one out of order. Then when it came to the graph labelled averages the order was completely wrong to what I predicted, I predicted the bigger the beaker the faster it will cool, if that happened the order would have been beaker 1, 2, 3, and then 4, but because it went wrong it turned out beaker 2, 4, 1 and then 3. if you look at the graph result 1 the problem was beaker 4, and in the graph result 2 the problem was beake r 3, I dont have a clue why those problems occurred, and by looking at the average I think I could have improved my experiment by doing it all over again but much more carefully this time round.